International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled “Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism” 16 January 2004. The report brings out how Pakistan has failed to live up to its promises for not allowing the Pakistani soil to be used for acts of terrorism anywhere in the world. Musharraf’s promises of January 12, 2002 not to allow any organization to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir; to crack down on terrorism; to regulate the Madrassas; and end jihadi culture in Pakistan have remained mere rhetoric. 3. On the terrorism front, though some groups were banned, their leaders were not convicted and even the banned terrorist organizations continued to work freely, including under new names. The report notes that “Even though once again banned in November 2003, many of these groups continue to function unhindered and are likely to once again resurface under the new names”. Moreover, very little was done by Pakistan to implement tougher controls on financing of madrassas and terrorist/ extremist groups despite obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1373. 4. To date, no Presidential Ordinance to regulate Madrassas has been promulgated; no national syllabus has been developed; and no regulations on funding of Madrassas have been adopted. 5. The report highlights that “Musharraf’s failure owes less to the difficulty of implementing the reforms that the military Government’s unwillingness in doing so. In fact, it has been co-opting religious extremists in furtherance of military government’s agenda and to neutralize the secular political opposition”. Report concludes that “reliant even more than in the past on the religious right for regime’s survival after the passage of the 17th Constitutional Amendment with MMA’s support, Musharraf is unlikely to take decisive actions he had pledged against domestic jihadis and jihadi madrassas in January 2004 and reiterated a number of times.” Notable extracts from the report are as below:
1. Pakistan’s military-run government, is more concerned about appeasing a valuable ally than tackling the threats of terrorism and extremism in earnest. 2. Keen on retaining international support, the government has apprehended and handed over to U.S. authorities foreigners with links to Al Qaeda. There is, however, no evidence of a focussed and systematic campaign against homegrown extremists, many of who have links to the very religious parties that the military currently patronises. 3. The initial ban had followed the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 and India’s charge of Pakistani involvement. However, the leaders of the banned parties were never brought to trial, and their detained activists were released within months under a general amnesty. 4. Maulana Azhar Masood of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba were only detained for a few months under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) legislation, and not under the more stringent Anti-Terrorism Act. Both were soon free to regroup their organisations. Maulana Masood Azhar renamed his Khudam-ul-Islam, while Hafiz Muhammad Saeed changed the LeT’s name to Jamaat al-Dawa (JD). Both leaders have continued to issue open calls for a jihad in Kashmir, despite President Musharraf’s January 2002 pledge that no one would be allowed to do so. At its annual congregation in the central Punjab town of Patoki in October 2003, for instance, JD speakers openly propagated and organised contingents for the jihad in Kashmir. Although these activities clearly violate numerous articles of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the government only placed the JD on its terrorism watch list in November 2003. 5. Some officials in the law ministry argue that leaders such as Hafiz Saeed could not be prosecuted under the Anti-Terrorism Act since he had stepped down as the head of LeT two weeks before its proscription. However, the Anti-Terrorism Act stipulates that any person who has committed a terrorist offence before or after the enforcement of the Act will be considered a terrorist and prosecuted as such. On a number of occasions, the LeT as well as Jaish have taken responsibility for terrorist attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir. According to Pakistani law, this would make their members liable to charges of terrorism. 6. Musharraf’s Kashmir policy continues that of his military predecessors, who, beginning in the late 1980s, supported a proxy war against India, equipping and funding jihadi groups in Indian-administered Kashmir. Despite his January 2002 pledge to end such activity, it continues largely unabated. 7. The president emphasises that his government would “take to task every extremism. No extremism will be allowed in Pakistan”. Nevertheless, government officials continue to distinguish between Kashmiri “freedom fighters” and terrorists.
Terrorist Financing 8. Just as the government is ignoring its obligations under Resolution 1373 to bring to justice anyone who has supported or participated in the planning, preparation or execution of terrorist acts, it has also failed to enforce important provisions of the resolution regarding financial controls. While some Arab-based charities have been closed, measures have yet to be taken to regulate the funding of madrasas. As a result, there is no way of monitoring and ending the flow of funds to religious extremists. The military-led government has yet to sign the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 9. Pakistan’s financial managers are ignoring Resolution 1373’s requirements to criminalise the funding and financial assets of entities that attempt or participate in terrorist acts. According to government records, the assets of fifteen organisations and individuals in nine banks, amounting to Rs.641.41 million (U.S. $11.5 million), had been frozen by June 2003. However, most of these organisations and individuals were not on the watch list nor were many of the former banned, as required by the anti-terrorism law. 10. While it initially pledged to introduce an Anti-Money Laundering Act to curb terrorist financing, it claimed in its report to the UN Counter- Terrorism Committee in March 2003 that the issue was adequately dealt with by the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997. 11. Pakistan also lacks legislative provisions that allow the government to freeze funds, financial assets or economic resources of persons or entities suspected of terrorism on the request of another state. In addition, Pakistan provides legal guarantees to account holders of foreign currencies against temporary or permanent restrictions. Moreover, there are virtually no restrictions at entry points, except for an upper limit of U.S. $10,000 on transfers to Afghanistan. 12. While Musharraf’s government enacted a law in 2002 requiring hawala dealers to register with the government and document their transactions and closed down a number of unregistered firms, many unregistered firms remain active. According to a July 2003 report by the Security Council Committee, established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities: “Pakistani bankers investigating such activity last year estimated hawala accounts for around U.S.$3 billion entering their country every year, compared with only U.S.$1 billion via the formal banking system. It is more than likely that these informal transfer flows continue to remain a major source of illegal funding for extremists and terrorists.
Appeasement of the Mullahs 13. The Seventeenth Amendment’s allocation of sweeping powers to an unelected president and army chief have stalled democratic transition. Musharraf has had considerable success convincing influential international actors, in particular the U.S., that Pakistan has no viable civilian alternative to implement vital political, social and economic reforms and eliminate Islamist extremism. The military’s strategies of regime survival, centring on the empowerment of the religious right to offset its secular political opposition, however, are likely only to undermine the U.S. goal of eliminating terrorism in the region. 14. Musharraf distinguished between the MMA and Islamist extremist forces. Until 2003, Musharraf had called the MMA’s constituent parties a threat to Pakistan’s national interests. However, in the run up to the December 2003 agreement, he argued that the MMA was far more reasonable in its approach to national issues than other political forces.
Madrasa Reforms 15. Bent on appeasing the mullahs, the military continues to stall on measures to contain Islamist extremism, including madrasa reform. However, its alliance with the mullahs has resulted in a resurgence of such extremism, which will ultimately work to its disadvantage. 16. The government’s policy on madrasa reform remains largely rhetorical. Despite the promises to register all madrasas and regulate their curriculum and funding by the end of 2002, the government took no concrete action. Most significantly, the draft madrasa law, approved by Musharraf’s cabinet in June 2002, was not enacted. 17. Most madrasas are still unregistered, and the government now assures the clergy that it will not interfere in the madrasas’ internal affairs. Musharraf’s pledge that all madrasas would adopt government-prescribed syllabi by the end of 2002 also remains unfulfilled. 18. Many madrasas are run by the MMA’s component parties, particularly the two factions of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a Sunni Deobandi party that won the largest share of parliamentary seats among the MMA’s coalition partners in the October 2002 national elections. After they provided decisive support for the LFO, MMA leaders reiterated their opposition to any governmental oversight of the madrasas. Musharraf is unlikely to risk continuation of that support over an issue like madrasa reform. 19. On 18 August 2001, the Musharraf government issued an ordinance to institute the Pakistan Madrasa Education Board (PMEB). The PMEB’s mandate is to establish model madrasas and to regulate and approve conditions of existing seminaries on the recommendations of its Academic Council. The PMEB may also grant affiliations to existing madrasas in the private sector. This affiliation does not require registration but is instead an effort to encourage madrasas to provide both religious and secular education. According to a member of the board, only 449 madrasas have applied thus far for affiliation with the PMEB. There is no confirmation whether a standardised curriculum has been introduced in these madrasas. The PMEB has only distributed questionnaires to obtain voluntary information about their functioning. It does not possess the authority to enforce registration. With its limited mandate, the PMEB is more a cosmetic measure to address international concern about Pakistan’s religious schools than a mechanism to regulate their functioning. 20. Religious activists reject madrasa reform on the grounds that it caters to a foreign agenda. However, there is much more to the clergy’s opposition. Any regulation of madrasa syllabi and funding would clearly undermine their political autonomy and permit official oversight of their sources of funding. 21. Proposed Madrasa Reform Project (MRP) follows the government’s Education Policy guidelines that seek to guarantee Pakistani citizens their constitutional right to education and training, and to evolve an integrated system of national education by narrowing the gap between the curricula of madrasas and modern schools. 47 amendment also makes it mandatory for all societies and institutions which might act as conduits for such financing to keep bank accounts and information about their employers and clients or be subject to fines and closure. The same clerics who put up strong resistance to the proposed Deeni Madaris (Voluntary Registration and Regulation) Ordinance in 2002 have responded favourably to the proposed MRP, since it will allow them funding without any regulation of their finances or the Islamic portions of their curricula. 22. Many madrasas in Pakistan continue to provide foot soldiers for jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Sectarian Violence 23. Within Pakistan, the jihadi madrasa also continues to play a central role in promoting sectarian hatred and violence. As in the Zia years, the military’s erstwhile tacit and now open support for the religious right has also reinforced sectarian divisions. The resurgence of Islamist extremist organisations is evident in the rising graph of sectarian violence, even in regions like Baluchistan where such attacks were once unknown. 24. Since Pakistan increased its support for the Kashmir jihad in the 1990s, a more pernicious variety of religious school has emerged, controlled by the Jamaat al-Dawa, whose armed wing, the LeT (renamed the JD after its parent organisation was banned in 2002), is in the forefront of the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. 25. While the Musharraf government has repeatedly downplayed the link between jihad and the madrasa, the leaders of these schools say otherwise. “Madrasas play an important role in the propagation of jihad and are essential for the preaching of Islam”, said Maulana Saleemullah Khan, who heads Jamia Farooqia madrasa in the southern port city of Karachi, a hotbed of sectarian conflict. His reference was clearly to the armed struggle in Kashmir, Afghanistan and other parts of the Muslim world. 26. Despite the obvious dangers in granting jihadi madrasas almost complete autonomy over their functioning and funding, the military – with its own motto of Jihad fi sabi Allah (Jihad in the way of Allah) – continues to promote these schools for its external goals. 27. Teachers at the primary level introduce their pupils to the basics of jihad, offering instructions on how to wage a jihad against infidels and using the Afghan and Kashmiri mujahidin as examples. The mullahs who run these jihadi madrasas have expanded their anti-India and anti-Hindu doctrine to include an overtly anti-Western one. Central Punjab, particularly the districts of Gujranwala and Lahore, remains the epicentre of this new variety of madrasa. The report concludes that “any action, whether it involves the reform of the madrasa, curbs on the flow of terrorist-related financing, or a crackdown on jihadi groups, will also require a transformation of Pakistan’s political status quo. The restoration of legitimate civilian authority would empower mainstream moderate parties and reduce the political clout of the religious right. While the prospects for a resumed democratic transition ultimately rest on Pakistan’s internal dynamics, international support would go a long way toward helping tilt the balance from the military to the civilian.” ***
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